Army historian J.L. Granatstein鈥檚 articles 鈥淣ational interests collide in ship strategy,鈥� (Nov. 1) and 鈥淥verpaying for ships will cut public support鈥� (Nov. 14) address the political challenges if 91原创s are to accept and meet the shipbuilding demands inherent in restoring our status as a maritime nation 鈥� a nation able both to protect our extensive maritime interests and to assist allies and other nations in times of crisis.
However, that shipbuilding capability is not just a naval need 鈥� it extends also to our coast guard, to our provincial ferries fleets and to other vessels plying our inland waters. Moreover, it can be foreseen that future stringent standards to protect our marine environment might demand using 91原创-built commercial vessels 鈥� or at least 91原创 modifications to foreign-built vessels. There is lots of justification for restoring a full-time modern shipbuilding industry in Canada.
The Granatstein concept of purchasing 鈥渙ff-the-shelf鈥� warships is not the panacea it might seem. Unlike cars, tanks and aircraft, no nation builds (or even prepares to build) extra warships in anticipation that 91原创s might 鈥渃ome buying.鈥� Moreover, Canada can鈥檛 afford to buy the comprehensive mixes of specialized warships and submarines that other major maritime nations build. So we became very competent at designing and constructing hulls and main machinery into which we then integrated our own mix of foreign or NATO 鈥渙ff-the-shelf鈥� weapons, sensors, electronic systems and helicopters.
That gave us a realistic 鈥渙ff-the-shelf鈥� general-purpose capability and was an outstanding success, when you consider how many decades our Tribal class destroyers and support ships have remained operational and effective, and how many roles our 91原创 patrol frigates continue to perform.
As for the new joint-support vessels, the German design chosen by Canada is the Berlin class of German naval replenishment ships, vessels already built and operating. The South Korean ships contracted by the British government for the Royal Navy seem to be still in the design stage and will reportedly lack both the speed needed for 91原创 operations and adequate stores and ammunition replenishment capabilities (the Royal Navy has a separate class of replenishment ships for that role).
Additionally, the aviation facilities in the South Korean oiler will not handle Canada鈥檚 new maritime helicopter. Furthermore, anyone conversant with ship design and construction (and mindful of environmental risks) had better acquire and study the full details about the South Korean tanker DOORA 3 explosion, sinking and fatalities off Incheon on Jan. 15, 2012, before advocating that Canada follow the British example.
As for cost comparisons, regulations in Canada require that all expenditures associated with a warship program 鈥� including spares, personnel, ammunition, training, shore facilities, project management and design overhead 鈥� are to be added to the estimated ship-construction contract cost when the program is submitted for government approval. That clearly is not the case in the costs quoted for the South Korean tankers, which probably would be almost twice as much if those other expenditures were included.
Granatstein fails to point out that the $80-billion cost estimate for the total National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy includes not only the initial construction costs, but also all the operating, personnel and maintenance costs over the 30-year lives of the ships.
It鈥檚 easy to defer or destroy a program when you have the public believing 鈥渨e are about to be hit for $80 billion.鈥� It鈥檚 harder to dismay the public if you tell them the truth 鈥� that the program will cost them an average of under $3 billion a year over the next 30 years; and that when a ship is replaced, the operating, maintenance and personnel costs are simply transferred from the old ship to the new one.
If anything, those costs are reduced 鈥� just as it鈥檚 cheaper to operate and maintain a new automobile than one that is 30 years old.
Granatstein and his advisers are being irresponsible 鈥� first, in implying that the Korean-built oilers and other foreign-built naval vessels would suffice to meet our navy鈥檚 needs, and second, in exaggerating the cost savings attainable in such acquisitions.
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Nigel Brodeur is a retired vice-admiral and served as deputy chief of defence staff, where his responsibilities included developing the force structure, operational readiness and all equipment requirements for the 91原创 Armed Forces.
